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SECTION II: ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES BY STRATEGIC OUTCOME

Analysis by Program Activity

Program Activity

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has one strategic outcome that affects the daily lives of all people in Canada: to ensure safe and secure nuclear installations and processes that are used solely for peaceful purposes; and public confidence in the nuclear regulatory regime’s effectiveness. To fulfill this outcome, the CNSC operates one program activity as defined by the Treasury Board Secretariat’s Program Activity Architecture: nuclear regulation.

The Nuclear Regulation program activity is described as regulation of the use of nuclear energy and materials to protect health, safety, security and the environment and to respect Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  From an operational planning and performance management perspective, all of CNSC 2006-07 priorities align directly with this program activity.

Activities carried out under the nuclear regulation program activity allow achievement of the following:

• a low frequency of incidents, accidents and precursors in the use of nuclear substances and processes;
• low levels of exposure, to humans and to the environment, to any harmful substances as a result of nuclear installations and processes;
• a commitment and full engagement of the regulated community to sustain a strong culture of safety and security in the use of nuclear installations and processes;
• that transfers of nuclear goods and technology in Canada and from Canada are solely for peaceful purposes; and
• that Canadians have knowledge of and confidence in the CNSC as a strong, independent regulator.

Within the nuclear regulation program activity, the CNSC has five program sub-activities, each with a distinct expected result. These program sub-activities represent key program areas for the CNSC in achieving its priorities identified in Section I, the expected results of its program activity, and its strategic outcome These sub-activities are in accordance with the CNSC’s Program Activity Architecture.  The program sub-activities, their expected results and the resource expenditure for each are articulated in Figure 6.

Figure 6.

Program Sub-Activities	Expected Result	Planned Spending (in $000s)	Actual Spending (in $000s)
Regulatory Framework	A clear and pragmatic regulatory framework	6,432	9,213
Licensing and Certification	Individuals and organizations that operate safely and conform to safeguards and non-proliferation requirements	20,033	14,897
Compliance	High levels of compliance with the regulatory framework	35,803	34,245
Cooperative Undertakings	Cooperation and integration of CNSC’s activities in national/international nuclear fora	17,784	20,367
Stakeholder Relations	Stakeholders’ understanding of the regulatory program	6,447	6,540
Totals:		86,499	85,262

The CNSC’s 2006-07 Report on Plans and Priorities outlined plans for the year for key programs within each program sub-activity.  Therefore, the following sections describe the expected results, performance measures and actual performance using the same approach.

1.      Regulatory Framework

The CNSC’s regulatory framework is composed of the following elements:

• The Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), regulations and regulatory documents;
• The Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol between Canada and the IAEA, and Canada’s bilateral and multilateral nuclear cooperation agreements;
• Bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between Canada and its nuclear trading partners;
• The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act; and
• The Nuclear Liability Act.

The program area encompasses development of a modern, evergreen Canadian regulatory regime that considers all available science as well as operating experience and input of Canadian operators, other stakeholders and the international community– to develop new and amend existing CNSC regulations and to create regulatory policies, standards and guides that set out the CNSC’s regulatory criteria and expectations.

The expected result is a clear and pragmatic regulatory framework for Canadians. Achievement is measured as indicated in Figure 7.

Figure 7.

Expected Result	Outcome Measure	Target 2006-07	Performance 2005-06	Performance 2006-07
A clear and pragmatic regulatory framework	Percentage of regulations under review/revision in each to ensure a complete rolling review over five years	20%	27% (3 of 11)*	36 % (4 of 11)* In addition development work on one new regulation
	Number of regulations published in the Canada Gazette	3	1	1**
	Number of regulatory documents finalized and published	15	5	3***

* In 2006-07, there were 11 regulations pursuant to the NSCA.
** CNSC experienced delays in the approval process for certain regulations.  These were subsequently published in the Canada Gazette in May 2007.
*** The CNSC has reviewed its targets for publication of regulatory documents and has prioritized them for future years.  The CNSC’s regulatory policy committee will ensure that higher-priority documents are published as required.

1.1       2006-07 Regulatory Program

During 2006-07, the CNSC made further progress in refining its regulatory framework under the NSCA. The government approved new security regulations, and three more regulations were amended and are to be submitted for approval. A Regulatory Policy Committee, chaired by the Secretary of the Commission, has been established with the CNSC staff to provide strategic-level direction and to coordinate the identification, development and implementation of a revised CNSC regulatory policy framework.  Throughout 2006-07, the committee examined policies to provide broader consultation with stakeholders and greater consistency to the regulatory process, from concept to approval, for the Commission.

The regulatory program consists of regulations and regulatory documents. Work on regulatory documents was in accordance with plans stated in the Report on Plans and Priorities 2006-07, except as noted above.  The following (see Figure 8.) summarizes changes in CNSC regulations, and work on the regulatory documents is described in detail in Section IV – Other Items of Interest.

Figure 8.

Nuclear Security Regulations	The updated Nuclear Security Regulations, which introduced heightened safety measures for nuclear facilities, came into force in November 2006.
Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices Regulations Class II Nuclear Facilities and Prescribed Equipment Regulations Nuclear Non-Proliferation Import and Export Control Regulations	Amendments for these three sets of regulations have been prepared and will be published early in the Canada Gazette in 2007-08.  This is later than planned by a few months and may delay the finalization of these amendments beyond the plan for the end of 2007-08.
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rules of Procedure Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission By-laws	Scheduled work to amend the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Rules of Procedure and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission By-laws is a continuous improvement initiative.  This project continued to move forward, although progress over the past year was slower than anticipated due to an increased Commission workload.
New Nuclear Safeguards Regulations	The CNSC staff continued to work on new Nuclear Safeguards Regulations to clarify and consolidate measures to be undertaken by licensees to meet the requirements of the NSCA and the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol between Canada and the IAEA.

1.2       Towards a Modernized Safeguards Framework

The CNSC, in cooperation with the IAEA, has been actively preparing for the implementation of a state-level integrated safeguards program to meet Canada’s increased international safeguards obligations, while enhancing the efficiency of IAEA safeguards implementation. During 2006-07, agreement was reached with the IAEA on the transition to implementation of the State-level Integrated Safeguards Approach (SLA) for Canada, based upon agreed priorities and available resources. On January 1, 2007, implementation of the SLA was achieved for that sector of the nuclear program, which includes research reactors and static dry storage facilities.  Following this, the SLA was applied to the transfer of spent fuel to dry storage facilities at multi-unit CANDU reactors on March 1, 2007. The latter achievement was the culmination of over two years of intensive effort on the part of the IAEA, the CNSC, and affected licensees to address an issue that was consuming a significant portion of the IAEA safeguards resources under the traditional approach.

In addition, the CNSC continued to work towards developing an effective national nuclear verification program focused on regulatory compliance with domestic requirements for nuclear material control. The program will also complement the CNSC’s efforts to discharge its responsibilities for implementing the safeguards agreements between Canada and the IAEA. To that end, the CNSC initiated interdepartmental discussions on the rationale for this initiative and began work on defining the requirements for a national verification authority.

2.      Licensing and Certification

This program sub-activity area covers issuance of licences or certification of persons to conduct nuclear-related activities in Canada and the certification of prescribed equipment. To issue a licence or a certificate, the CNSC must obtain evidence of the applicant’s ability to operate safely and conform to safeguards and non-proliferation obligations.

The result is that licences or certificates will be issued only to individuals and organizations that operate safely and conform to safeguards and non-proliferation requirements, or to those who demonstrate that prescribed equipment will be safe for use.

Achievement of this result is measured by the following criteria:

• The number of delays in implementing effective regulatory control (licensing action) pursuant to the NSCA; and
• The number and significance of Significant Development Reports

The data capture methodology for these measures is under development.

2.1              Licensing

In 2006-07, the Commission conducted 49 hearings, where it duly considered submissions from applicants and input from CNSC expert staff and interested stakeholders and documented them in detailed records of proceedings.  This represented a 69% increase in the number of hearings over the past year as compared to those that took place in 2005-06.  The average 18-day period to release a decision this year was significantly better than the performance standard of 30 business days, and 36 decisions were released within this 30-day standard - representing turnaround time that surpass best practices of the Canadian administrative tribunal community.  In instances where performance standards were not met, reasons for delay included the Commission’s greatly increased workload, a higher number of complex hearings, and the conduct of several hearings in affected communities.

Streamlining
Hearings were also conducted by panels of the Commission with the aim of increasing efficiency of the Commission’s operations and maintaining their effectiveness.  The CNSC President established several panels of one or more members to exercise Commission functions throughout the past year.  This practical use of the Commission tribunal’s resources demonstrates commitment towards good governance while delivering the CNSC’s mandate through timely licensing decisions.  Under the NSCA, the presence of all Commission Members is not required each time the Commission acts, because a smaller panel of members may exercise certain Commission powers.  This use of panels is in line with the practices of other Canadian administrative tribunals.

Abridged Hearings
The Commission has moved toward holding more hearings as abridged hearings so it can operate more efficiently.  Based on circumstances and the nature of the matter at hand, an abridged hearing can be held before a panel within a shorter-than-usual time frame.  An abridged hearing may be appropriate if certain criteria are met - for example, if the issue is administrative, does not involve new or unproven technology, would not compromise safety, or has not generated high levels of public interest.

Nuclear Reactors
The Commission granted five-year licence renewals to New Brunswick Power Nuclear’s Point Lepreau Generating Station and to Hydro-Québec’s Gentilly-2 reactor in Bécancour, Québec.

In July 2006, the CNSC announced its decision to renew the nuclear research and test establishment operating licence for Chalk River Laboratories until October 31, 2011.  In 2006, the CNSC received two applications, one from Bruce Power and one from Ontario Power Generation, to prepare sites for new reactors.

The CNSC has begun the regulatory work associated with oversight of the renewal of the operating licences for the reactors at Pickering and Darlington, which will expire in 2008.

Nuclear Substances and Radiation Devices
Through risk-informed licensing of nuclear substances and radiation devices, CNSC staff ensured effective regulatory control over the activities of all applicants and licensees. With this approach, CNSC staff continued to consistently apply regulatory requirements to the more than 2,500 licensees of this type across Canada. CNSC also provided ongoing written and verbal information about the CNSC’s expectations of applicants and licensees to ensure transparency and to promote understanding of regulatory obligations.

In July 2006, CNSC staff implemented a new licence format for nuclear substances and radiation devices and Class II facilities that standardized the layout and presentation of information in the licence.  In addition to revising some licence conditions to increase clarity, new features were added, including the ability to reference licensee commitments as part of the licence itself. This change allowed licensees to propose alternate methods of achieving compliance with the regulatory framework and provided the basis for assessing compliance. Other changes were carried out to enhance security of information and changes to annual compliance reports, including their incorporation as part of the licence, further streamlining the reporting process for all licensees.  Licensees have generally embraced these changes and have taken the opportunity to include specific procedures as part of their licences. 

The number of each type of CNSC licence varies slightly from year to year. Since the end of the 2005 fiscal year, the total number of licences issued through the CNSC’s Directorate of Nuclear Substance Regulation has increased more than 7%. This licensing work is directly influenced by changes and advances in various fields, such as medical diagnosis and therapy.

Export and Import Licences of Sealed Sources
Canada is one of the world’s largest suppliers of sealed sources and is one of 88 countries that have committed to the IAEA to work toward full implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.  At the end of 2006-07, the CNSC launched a strengthened export and import licensing and control program for risk-significant sealed sources.  The program requires licensees wishing to export certain sealed sources to obtain transaction-specific export licences from the CNSC.

The new export and import control program for risk-significant sealed sources completed the second of two initiatives to adopt the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources. The implementation of the new control program, together with the enhanced National Sealed Source Registry (described further under “Sealed Source Tracking System” in sub-section 3.3) will assure Canadians and the international community that international transfers of risk-significant sealed sources are conducted in a safe and secure manner.

2.2       Certification

Certification of Radiation Safety Officers and Exposure Device Operators
Amendments were introduced to the Class II Nuclear Facilities and Prescribed Equipment Regulations, which will impose certification requirements for radiation safety officers in Class II nuclear facilities. The majority of these facilities are cancer clinics that use a wide variety of radioactive nuclear substances to treat cancer.

The CNSC staff initiated a comprehensive review of the processes for certification of exposure device operators.  Following meetings with the radiography industry and Natural Resources Canada, a CNSC working group prepared a report containing numerous recommendations to improve the certification process for these operators, who had previously been granted lifetime certification.

Examination Transfer Project
The CNSC currently reviews and approves examination packages that licensees prepare pursuant to the certification of nuclear power plant operators, but is planning to transfer the responsibility of examination preparation and conduct entirely to licensees. In the future, the CNSC will continue to certify individuals in designated nuclear power plant operations positions, but will no longer be involved in approving the written and simulator-based examinations.  Consequently, the CNSC is in the process of developing a compliance program to support an effective regulatory regime post-exam transfer.

3.      Compliance

Achieving high levels of compliance with the nuclear regulatory framework is critical to the CNSC’s work and assuring the safety of nuclear installations and processes. The CNSC’s compliance work also involves making sure that Canada complies with its international commitments.

The expected result is a high level of compliance with the regulatory framework, assessed through the measures stated in the following table (see Figure 9.)

Figure 9.

Expected Result	Outcome Measure	Target 2006-07	Performance 2005-06	Performance 2006-07
High levels of compliance with the regulatory framework	The CNSC publishes an annual report on the performance of nuclear power plants in established safety areas. Level of licensee performance ratings are assessed by the CNSC for each of the power reactors, as per the CNSC Report Card on Nuclear Power Plant Performance. The CNSC uses separate measures to evaluate the quality of the existing safety program and its implementation. The 2006 report can be found on the CNSC Web site at www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca.	B ratings	Available on CNSC’s web site	See section IV
	Levels of performance of non-power reactor licensees as measured by the CNSC through inspections, events, assessments, and evaluations of compliance with licence requirements. Performance ratings are recorded in formal licensing documents.		Reporting under development
	Annual IAEA statement concluding that Canada is in compliance with its commitments pursuant to the Canada/IAEA safeguards agreements.	Achievement	Achieved	Achieved
	Provision by the CNSC of nuclear transfer notifications and reports pursuant to bilateral administrative arrangements.	100%	Achieved	Achieved

3.1        Monitoring Compliance

Achieving high levels of compliance with the nuclear regulatory framework is critical to the CNSC’s work and to assuring the safety of nuclear installations and processes.  The Commission regularly receives information on licensee performance and compliance with regulatory requirements through various public reporting formats.  These include annual reports on the safety performance of the power industry, mid-term performance reports for the majority of the facilities licensed by the CNSC, and Significant Development Reports.

Through a rigorous reporting process on significant developments in the industry, CNSC staff apprised the Commission of events of existing or potential safety concern.  Meetings were open to the public and the transcripts and meeting minutes are published on the CNSC Web site.  Public reporting provides openness and transparency of the CNSC’s ongoing regulatory oversight and ensures that licensees remain accountable and take necessary actions to resolve issues.

Chalk River Laboratories
The Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL) Chalk River Laboratories site is Canada’s oldest and most complex nuclear facility. To effectively monitor activities at this facility, the CNSC established an on-site office at Chalk River with four CNSC staff to oversee licensee compliance and to communicate with licensee staff to improve their understanding of regulatory requirements. A full-time Safeguards Officer has also been assigned to this site office to assist with implementing safeguards at this facility.

During the year, licensing staff reviewed and prepared recommendations to the Commission on matters that included the handling of legacy waste and the decommissioning of certain facilities. In addition, CNSC staff presented its midterm report on AECL’s MAPLE (Multipurpose Applied Physics Lattice Experiment) reactors to the Commission. CNSC staff paid specific attention to two areas: monitoring licensee progress in addressing weaknesses in the implementation of programs concerning operational performance, performance assurance and environmental protection; and evaluating progress in commissioning and resolving issues outstanding at the time of licence renewal.

Uranium Mines
A major flood occurred in October 2006 at Cameco’s Cigar Lake uranium mine in northern Saskatchewan. CNSC staff responded quickly during the incident to provide regulatory oversight while the licensee managed the flood. CNSC staff has since been reviewing the circumstances surrounding the flood, and Cameco presented an initial report to the Commission in November 2006. Analysis of the root cause is ongoing.

Also in 2006, the Commission determined, based on evidence provided by the licensee and CNSC staff, that selenium, a contaminant in the effluent from Cameco’s Key Lake Mill in Saskatchewan, was being released in concentrations and quantities that posed an unreasonable risk to the environment.   Through a scientific study, CNSC environmental science experts determined that cumulative releases of selenium exceeded those predicted in the licensing environmental assessment and posed an unreasonable risk to the environment. This finding stopped a proposed expansion of the Key Lake facility.  Based on recommendations by CNSC staff, Cameco applied for a licence amendment, and the Commission issued an amended licence that set out mitigating measures to control environmental impacts of the selenium. The CNSC scientific study on selenium was peer reviewed in the U.S. and in Canada, and its results will affect the uranium mining industry as a whole as well as future regulation of the Canadian uranium mining industry.

Compliance Among Industrial Radiography Licensees
Industrial radiography is a non-destructive technique used to examine the integrity of welds, the quality of castings and the adequacy of pressure vessels by remote manipulation of high-risk radioactive sources to expose photographic film.  The CNSC licenses radiographers in all provinces, and 70% of these licensees are based in Western Canada, where they work predominantly in the oil and gas sector.  While the number of industrial radiography licences has remained relatively stable, the need for regulatory oversight for this high-risk group continues to demand significant CNSC resources.  The CNSC has a strategy for ensuring continued effective regulatory control in the industrial radiography industry.  An important aim of this strategy is to help industry members understand the importance of adherence to regulatory requirements, to ensure the health and safety of workers and the public.  CNSC has seen a decrease in the number of incidents and an associated reduction in radiation doses to workers.

Performance Measures in Nuclear Substance Regulation
The CNSC implemented a new standard regarding inspections (results presented in Figure 10) whereby an inspector will produce a report, for issue to the licensee within 60 business days of an inspection.  This condition was met in 90% of type II[2] inspections of high-risk licensees during 2006-07.

Type I inspections have presented a challenge because of rapid expansion at nuclear medicine facilities at Canadian hospitals and an associated increase in regulatory work. Some provinces have seen a consolidation of cancer clinics, which used to be managed by individual licensees and are now being controlled by central boards or provincial agencies. Although the number of licensees has slightly decreased, the rapid expansion of nuclear medicine facilities and cancer clinics has increased the overall workload for CNSC staff.

Mitigating strategies have been put in place, enabling the CNSC to identify potential risks early in the process and to ensure the safety of the Canadian public despite limited resources.  As cancer clinics go through construction, commissioning and operation stages, regulatory verifications are made to identify potential risks. Once a discrepancy is identified, an inspection is automatically triggered to ensure compliance.

Figure 10.

2006-07 Performance Standard Report
	Type I Inspections	Assessments	Type II Inspections	Annual Compliance Reports
Risk Category
High	45	104	408	314
Medium	20	525	779	1448
Low	0	46	4	370
Total	65	675	1191	2132
Percentage Within Standard	46.15%	93.48%	88.33%	72.51%

3.2        Orders Issued

The Commission was involved in a larger number of reviews of orders in 2006-07 than during previous reporting periods.  The Commission reinforced its commitment to the safety of Canadians through its orders against licensees found to be non-compliant with the NSCA or conditions of their licences.  Through its orders against licensees such as Enviropac, SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc., and ESI Resources Limited, the Commission ensured that facilities operated without unreasonable risk, demonstrating a more vigorous compliance/enforcement approach.

Enviropac
In September 2006, a CNSC Designated Officer issued an Order to Enviropac Inc. to immediately cease activities relating to the use, transfer, import, export and servicing of nuclear substances and prescribed equipment.  The Order was issued based on CNSC staff concerns regarding Enviropac’s qualifications and commitment to make adequate provision for the health and safety of persons and protection of the environment.

In accordance with the NSCA and Regulations, the Order was referred to the Commission for review.  In December 2006, the Commission confirmed the Order requiring Enviropac to cease all activities under its CNSC licence.  CNSC staff inspected the site a number of times in the interim to verify compliance with the Designated Officer Order and to ensure that appropriate security measures were taken.

In February 2007, the Commission resumed the hearing to consider amending the Designated Officer Order, based on recommendations from CNSC staff and the licensee.  Following the February hearing, CNSC staff received a report of the discovery of an orphaned sealed source containing a nuclear substance.  The investigation carried out by CNSC staff showed that the sealed source was last in the possession of Enviropac.  Based on the potential risk due to loss of control, CNSC staff issued further recommendations to the Commission on regulatory actions to be taken, for consideration in its deliberations.  The commission decision on the matter is expected in 2007-08.

SRB Technologies
In August 2006, a CNSC Designated Officer issued an order to SRB Technologies (Canada) Inc. (SRBT) to cease and desist the processing and use of tritium, to prevent further damage to the environment, which had been detected in the land near the SRBT facility.  Later that month, SRBT was provided with an opportunity to be heard, after which the Commission amended the order and allowed the company to resume limited production.  The Commission informed SRBT that it would have to demonstrate at its licence renewal hearings in Fall 2006 that it was qualified to continue operations and was making adequate provisions to protect the health, safety, and security of Canadians and the environment.  The Commission also requested a detailed report describing the actions and measures SRBT would take to identify and contain all impacts on the environment, to prevent or mitigate any further impact on the environment, and to remediate impacts on the environment. 

In October 2006, the Commission held a public hearing on SRBT’s application to renew its operating licence.  CNSC staff reported that SRBT had not yet responded with the actions and measures specified earlier by the Commission.  The Commission heard 93 interventions on the second day of the hearing in late November 2006, confirming a high level of public interest and concern.

The Commission considered all information presented and, in January 2007, decided not to renew SRBT’s nuclear substance processing facility operating licence.  Instead, it issued a new class of licence that allowed the company to possess tritium, but not to process it.

In January 2007, the Commission directed CNSC staff to conduct research studies examining the health effects of tritium and how tritium moves through the environment, to enhance information available to guide regulatory oversight of tritium releases in Canada.

ESI Resources Limited
In February 2006, ESI Resources Limited filed a licence renewal application for its Calgary standby uranium recovery facility that did not include necessary prescribed information.  CNSC staff notified the licensee of the deficiencies in its application and requested a revised submission by March 15, 2006.  This information was not submitted in time, despite several subsequent requests from CNSC staff.

On June 26, 2006, CNSC staff conducted an inspection of the licensee’s facility.  Samples taken and analyzed revealed uranium contamination inside the dryer room and evaporation ponds.  On July 31, 2006, the company’s licence expired, rendering the licensee unauthorized to process and store uranium-contaminated materials.  CNSC staff issued an Order in August 2006 that ESI Resources take specified actions and measures to protect the environment from continued presence of uranium-contaminated material at the unlicensed site.  The Commission is in the process of reviewing the Order, and a decision is expected in 2007-08.

3.3       Canada’s Compliance with International Commitments

Maintaining a Positive IAEA Conclusion
In its Safeguards Implementation Report for 2006, the IAEA again concluded that all nuclear material in Canada remained in peaceful activities. It is based on the provision of credible assurance that all declared nuclear material in the country is for peaceful, non-explosive uses, and that there is no undeclared nuclear material or activity.  Canada is 1 of only 24 states (of 162 countries) that has received and maintained this conclusion.

The Canada-Agency Safeguards Implementation Consultation (CASIC) mechanism is an essential element for ensuring compliance with the Canada-IAEA safeguards agreements. As the designated authority for implementing these agreements the CNSC is the lead participant for Canada.  A CASIC meeting was held in November 2006, and several working-level meetings were held with the IAEA to discuss specific implementation issues.

Sealed Source Tracking System
In January 2004, Canada has committed to implementing the IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.  In 2006, Canada was among the first countries to announce its commitment to full implementation of the Code.

The Code of Conduct was created to address growing international concern over the safety of radiation sources, including the potential that sources could be used as radioactive dispersal devices or “dirty bombs”.  It outlines the need for participating countries to address five basic and mutually agreed upon requirements: a legislative framework, an independent regulator, a regulatory system for authorizations, trained and qualified personnel, and controls on the import and export of risk-significant radioactive sources.

Two major regulatory improvements initiatives were needed for the Canadian regulatory framework to meet the provisions of the Code in full: a sealed source tracking system conceived as part of an updated national registry for all radioactive sources, and enhanced import and export controls on risk-significant sources.

The CNSC regulates storage, use and disposal of radioactive sealed sources.  Thousands of radioactive sealed sources are licensed for use across Canada for medical and industrial purposes and the sources vary widely in radiological risk.  The highest-risk sources are used in radiation therapy, commercial sterilization and industrial radiography.  In 2006, CNSC implemented the Sealed Source Tracking System and National Sealed Source Registry and took steps to implement enhanced import and export controls on radioactive sealed sources.

The Sealed Source Tracking System strengthens control over high-risk radioactive sources by requiring licensees to report to the CNSC all imports, exports, receipts and transfers of high-risk sources.  In July 2006, the CNSC introduced secure, Web-based source tracking using the Government of Canada’s “epass” technology.

Throughout 2006-07, approximately 90% of the tracking system’s more than 30,000 transactions were reported by fax or e-mail, but more licensees are expected to use the Web-based system in the future. Resources were allocated during the year to train licensees in its use.  The number of sources in the new National Sealed Source Registry grew as the registry was populated throughout 2006-07 and now exceeds 7,000.  Canada is the first country with such robust inventory tracking controls. Several countries are choosing to learn from the Canadian experience. 

The enhancement of the Sealed Source Tracking System and the National Sealed Source Registry and the implementation of import and export controls (See “Export and Import Licences of Sealed Sources” under sub-section 2.1) provides assurance to Canadians and the global community that transfers of risk-significant sealed sources within and outside Canada are conducted and regulated appropriately for safety and security.

4.      Cooperative Undertakings

Figure 11.

Expected Result	Outcome Measure	Performance 2005-06	Performance 2006-07
CNSC cooperates and integrates its activities in national/international nuclear fora	100% verification by the CNSC of bilateral nuclear material inventory reports, annually	Achieved	Achieved

One outcome area of the Government of Canada’s Whole of Government Framework for Results is a safe and secure world through international cooperation.  The CNSC participates in domestic and international fora to advance nuclear safety and security both at home and abroad. Its international participation is a significant undertaking for the CNSC given the number, complexity and potential impact of nuclear-related issues worldwide.

Achievement of this result is presented in Figure 11.

Domestically, the CNSC is working increasingly with other federal departments and agencies and with provincial and territorial governments due to the growth in all nuclear sectors.  For example, proposals for new reactors and uranium mines in provinces where there are currently none has led to the need for high levels of consultation and cooperation with First Nations and others in Alberta and Nunavut.

4.1        International Cooperation to Advance Nuclear Safety

Convention on Nuclear Safety
At the third review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), held in Vienna in April 2005, Canada presented its report to an audience of more than 34 participants representing 18 countries. Canada committed to numerous follow-up actions.  The CNSC provided a status update on each of these elements in the first anniversary report on the CNS, which it issued in April 2006. Concrete steps have been taken to implement these follow-up actions.  Canada has instituted these reports to monitor progress over the subsequent three years in a public manner.

CNSC President Linda Keen continued her role as President of the third review meeting of the CNS, which will continue until the organizational meeting in September 2007.

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention) aims to ensure worldwide safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management, including the use of protective measures and mitigation. These objectives are achieved through peer review of the contracting parties’ national programs for spent fuel and radioactive waste management.  The Government of Canada has delegated responsibility for the Joint Convention to the CNSC.  

The second review meeting of the Joint Convention took place at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria, from May 15 to 24, 2006. Forty-one contracting parties participated in the peer review process.  Canada was recognized as having the following good practices:

• safe management of a wide variety of waste types;
• excellent stakeholder consultation supported by policies that promote openness and transparency;
• competent regulatory system with clear responsibilities;
• mechanisms in place to secure funding for long term liabilities; and
• implementation of the Sealed Source Tracking System.

Canada was recognized for its inclusive, balanced approach to field a delegation comprising the regulator, government and industry and was seen to have demonstrated an integrated waste management approach. The feedback Canada received also pointed out opportunities for improvement, including continued attention to regulatory documents and demonstration of progress on major initiatives.

Bilateral Relations With Nuclear Regulatory Counterparts
The CNSC maintains a network of memoranda of understanding with nuclear regulatory counterparts around the world with the objective of strengthening nuclear safety standards with respect to nuclear facilities and activities through technical cooperation and information exchanges in nuclear regulatory matters. An important milestone was achieved in 2006-2007 in this regard when the CNSC renewed its memorandum of understanding with the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), for implementation in April 2007. The renewal of this umbrella agreement with the USNRC created a foundation for the two organizations to engage in a host of regulatory cooperation initiatives, including nuclear safety of existing and new nuclear facilities, nuclear security and emergency preparedness. A second agreement between the CNSC and USNRC will allow exchange of information on the import and export of radioactive sources.

In August 2006, the CNSC President hosted an official delegation from the Autorité de sûreté nucléaire (ASN), the CNSC's nuclear regulatory counterpart agency in France. The delegation was visiting the CNSC to learn about the implementation of the NSCA as part of their preparations to implement their new legislation, “Transparency and Security in the Nuclear Field,” which was enacted on June 13, 2006. The new legislation, which considered the NSCA in its drafting, modernizes France’s nuclear regulatory framework. The exchange of information between the CNSC and the ASN focused on regulating nuclear power plants and other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as the implementation of Commission and public hearing processes.

The CNSC also routinely met with regulatory counterparts to exchange information. In 2006-07, meetings were held with regulatory counterparts from the Republic of Korea on the management of aging nuclear reactors. The CNSC also conducted workshops involving regulatory counterparts from the United States and Sweden regarding robustness of nuclear facilities and loss of coolant accident scenarios.

4.2       Multilateral Relations and International Cooperation

The CNSC continued to closely manage its engagement with international organizations in multilateral environments to advance nuclear safety and security as well as safeguards and non-proliferation objectives.

International Nuclear Regulators Association
The CNSC continued its involvement in the International Nuclear Regulators Association (INRA) in 2006-2007. The focus of the 2006-07 meetings included the exchange of best practices on waste management and improvement strategies for the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The INRA, established to influence and enhance nuclear safety from a regulatory perspective among its members, is comprised of the most senior regulatory authorities from Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 2006-2007, the association expanded its membership to include the Republic of Korea, a move that was strongly supported by the CNSC.

CANDU Senior Regulators Meeting
Canada continued to play a key role in the CANDU Senior Regulators organization established under the umbrella of the IAEA. This group is comprised of regulatory authorities from countries operating CANDU reactors including Argentina, Canada, China, India, Pakistan, Romania, and South Korea. The CNSC participated in the meeting of the CANDU Senior Regulators held in Karachi, Pakistan, in November 2006, and is making arrangements to host the next meeting in November 2007.

International Commission on Radiological Protection
Over the past several years, the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has been conducting worldwide public consultations on its new fundamental recommendations.  In August 2006, the CNSC held a workshop to discuss the draft ICRP recommendations, recognizing the need to bring together the views of various Canadian stakeholders. The objective was to develop an overall Canadian statement on key sections of the draft recommendations.  The results influenced regional and international discussions on the ICRP recommendations, allowing the collective Canadian viewpoint to be represented, rather than just that of a single individual or organization. The Canadian position covered many detailed technical issues.  One significant focus was the concept of dose and risk constraints, both with respect to clearly defining their role in the system of radiation protection and on how to implement them. 

The ICRP Main Commission approved its 2007 Fundamental Recommendations on Radiological Protection on March 21, 2007, and expects to publish them in the Fall 2007 issue of the Annals of the ICRP. This will mark the first publication of ICRP fundamental recommendations since 1990. The new recommendations consider new biological and physical information and trends in setting radiation standards. They also feature an improved and streamlined presentation, give more emphasis to environmental protection, and provide a platform for developing an updated strategy to handle emergencies and situations of pre-existing radiation exposure. The CNSC will analyze the final recommendations for their applicability to the Canadian regulatory framework.

OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
The CNSC continued its involvement with the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Committee’s on the Safety of Nuclear Installations and on Nuclear Regulatory Activities. It also provided representation to the Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health, an international forum to address issues related to enhancing radiation protection regulation and implementation. The CNSC also participated in the Multinational Design Evaluation Program under the NEA, as outlined in Section I of this report.

International Atomic Energy Agency
The CNSC continued supporting the IAEA, which will mark its 50^th anniversary in 2007. In 2006-07, the CNSC provided expertise to Canada’s Permanent Mission in Vienna and assisted in Canadian delegations to IAEA Board of Governors meetings and the agency’s general conference, held in September 2006. The CNSC also provides expertise to three important advisory committees under the IAEA: the Commission on Safety Standards and its sub-committees; the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation; and the Advisory Committee on Security.

Commission on Safety Standards
The CNSC provides Canada’s representative to the IAEA Director General’s Commission on Safety Standards (CSS), which has a special overview role with regard to the Agency’s safety standards and provides advice to the Director General on the overall program on regulatory aspects of safety. The CSS provides guidance on the strategy for establishing the Agency’s safety standards, particularly in order to ensure coherence and consistency between standards. It also endeavours to provide general advice and guidance on safety standards issues, relevant regulatory issues and the Agency’s safety standards activities and related programs, including those to promote worldwide application of the standards. The CSS achieved a major milestone in September 2006 with the approval of its Safety Fundamentals Principles. With its commitment to adopt and adapt international standards, where applicable, in developing the necessary modern regulatory framework for Canada, the CNSC attaches great importance to the Commission on Safety Standards and its sub-committees, covering safety standards, radiation safety, transport safety and waste safety.

IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation
The CNSC provides Canada’s representative to the IAEA Director General’s Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), which provides advice on the technical objectives and implementation parameters of IAEA safeguards and on the effectiveness and efficiency of specific implementation practices. A particular focus for SAGSI is further development of the state-level approach to safeguards implementation and evaluation. SAGSI examined issues that included the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness and performance, guidelines for state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, and the safeguards research and development program. The IAEA Director General appointed the Canadian representative to this group as the SAGSI chair, as of January 1, 2007.

IAEA Advisory Committee on Security
The CNSC provides Canada’s representative to the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security (AdSec), which advises the Agency on its role regarding nuclear security, nuclear security priorities, and the Agency's nuclear security program.

Over the past year, the AdSec has provided recommendations on the balance of devoting resources to technical support to improve nuclear security in developing countries, versus investing in technical development, versus development of the international legal framework. The Committee also reviewed the need for updated guidelines from the Agency in areas such as physical security, security fundamentals and security culture, and it discussed the Agency’s role in security information sharing, particularly with respect to illegal trade and cross-border movement of nuclear substances. It also reviewed the Agency's current security program and associated priorities.

Canadian Safeguards Support Program
The Canadians Safeguards Support Program, managed and funded by the CNSC, provides assistance to the IAEA to enhance its safeguards regime.  During the year, the program assisted the IAEA in developing a secure electronic mailbox, building on the public key infrastructure activities that the CSSP had initiated with the IAEA in the previous year. The mailbox process is one that the IAEA can use with other countries and that will play a role in the state-level safeguards approach for Canada.

The program has also continued its subprogram of equipment development for the IAEA and has made several advances. The software for irradiated fuel monitoring equipment, (for example, core discharge monitors and bundle counters used in safeguarding CANDU reactors) has been upgraded to include remote monitoring, whereby data is transmitted securely to the IAEA from facilities. This system offers increased efficiency for the IAEA and more timely evaluation of data. At the request of the IAEA, the Canadian Safeguards Support Program made numerous improvements to the Digital Cerenkov Viewing Device - a device that is used to verify spent nuclear fuel - that will increase its usability. The program also assisted the IAEA with the installing the core discharge monitor for Unit 2 at the Bruce A Nuclear Generating Station, as a result of the decision to restart this reactor.

5.      Stakeholder Relations

This program sub-activity focuses on the commitment to develop and maintain public confidence in Canada’s nuclear regulatory regime through working openly and transparently with stakeholders to achieve this goal. The following measures evaluate the achievement of the expected outcome of “stakeholder understanding of the regulatory program”:

• level of stakeholder confidence in the CNSC’s ability to regulate the use of nuclear energy and materials, through a survey that will be conducted every three years; and
• level of stakeholder participation in the CNSC’s decision-making process (measure under development).

The CNSC achieved a high level of performance against its 2006-07 plans. As interest and participation in the nuclear regulation process has been increasing, CNSC successfully met the changing and growing demands.

5.1      Strategic Communications Plan

The CNSC strategic communication plan provides a detailed approach of how to communicate and consult with stakeholders on the CNSC regulatory polices and program.

The plan involves a three-year phased approach. During 2006-07, the CNSC focused its outreach activities on heightening public awareness and understanding of its role and in regulating nuclear activities. The last year saw enhanced engagement with diverse stakeholders, including municipal governments in the region of major facilities, media, provincial officials, professional associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 

The CNSC meets periodically with representatives from the Canadian Nuclear Association through the Canadian Nuclear Association Regulatory Affairs Committee, which enables industry representatives to provide input and advice to the CNSC on broader issues relating to nuclear regulation in Canada. The committee also provides a forum for the industry association and the CNSC to indicate priorities, directions being taken, or factors that are influencing their respective operations.

In November 2006, CNSC staff established a Non-Governmental Organization Regulatory Affairs Committee to serve as a mechanism for the CNSC to communicate and consult with NGOs on nuclear regulatory and policy matters within the mandate of the CNSC. Co-chaired by a member of the NGO community, the committee is a forum for exchanging and clarifying information to promote common understanding of issues, allowing the CNSC to better respond to the information needs of the NGO community. It also enables NGO members to provide input and advice to the CNSC on broader issues relating to nuclear regulation in Canada.

5.2      Reaching Out to Communities

The Commission continued to focus on outreach and community engagement during 2006­-07.  Demonstrating its commitment to openness and accessibility, the Commission heard presentations and considered written submissions from more than 600 intervenors - whose voices are a key element in making informed decisions - with an interest in Commission business.

In addition to First Nations, a vast and varied audience of stakeholders - including the general public, unions, academics, special interest groups and other government bodies, all with differing interests - had the opportunity to participate in public hearings.  A number of intervenors voiced their support for the licence applications being considered by the Commission.  Several concerns were also brought forward, covering various aspects of the industry, from environmental protection, emergency preparedness and the length of licensing periods to anti-terrorism security measures.  The Commission reinforced to intervenors that safety and security are its most important priorities: It does not have an economic mandate, nor are its decisions based on the economic impact of a facility or on a decision’s potential impact on a facility.

The Commission heard concerns from several interveners regarding its move towards issuing longer licences where a licensee’s performance warranted such action.  The Commission aimed to assure the public that longer licences would allow CNSC staff and licensees to concentrate their efforts on ensuring safe operations on a daily basis and through longer-term planning.  If it is determined at any time that a licensee is not adhering to its licence conditions, the CNSC can and will take a range of possible actions, from review or revocation of a licence to prosecution.

As part of licensing and compliance monitoring of closed uranium mines in the Northwest Territories, CNSC staff maintains regular communications with government, aboriginal and community representatives.  CNSC staff also meets periodically with communities potentially affected by the historic transportation of uranium ore from the northern mines to processing facilities in the south. In February 2007, CNSC representatives engaged representatives from approximately 13 regulatory boards and agencies of the Northwest Territories by participating in a workshop on uranium and the North. The CNSC used this opportunity to share information on what environmental assessment and regulatory reviews might be expected if uranium development activities occurred and to provide information on the CNSC’s role in regulating uranium mines in Canada. Workshop attendees agreed on the importance of learning more about the CNSC and establishing better connections with it. The CNSC will follow up with participants to maintain open, transparent and effective relationships with representatives from the Northwest Territories.

6.      Other CNSC Programs

The CNSC’s Report on Plans and Priorities for 2006-07 included plans to improve elements of the management and enabling infrastructure.  Most of these activities have been discussed in Section I of this report under the priority of “Implement Improvement Initiatives”.  The CNSC was challenged to implement its published plans in this area because of the growth in workload across all areas and the competing demands for resources.  The following points summarize the results:

• CNSC recruitment and retention initiatives were significant as it sought to integrate new resources to meet its growth in workload and to fill the positions vacated by retirees;
• CNSC’s plan to develop a corporate risk framework as a component of strategic planning and management processes was not completed as planned by the end of 2006-07.  Work commenced late in the second half of the year and a plan is in place and resources have been allocated to complete this in 2007-08;
• Implementation of corporate performance measurement frameworks has taken more time than anticipated.  This is an important initiative that has required extensive internal consultations across operational and non-operational directorates.  Work will continue in 2007-08 and improvements will be ongoing in 2008-09 as part of the Integrated Planning and Performance Management project under the I3P; and
• Electronic records-management was completed as planned and is in use for 2007-08.

The CNSC entered into a first collective agreement with its represented employees for the period June 14, 2006 to March 31, 2008.  An arbitration award took effect November 20, 2006.

External Performance Standards

Performance standards have been developed for interactions with both external and internal stakeholders.  In line with the User Fees Act (2004) and the Treasury Board Policy on Service Standards for External Fees, a list of performance standards focusing on the needs and expectations of external stakeholders has been developed in consultation with stakeholders.  Work to implement these standards continues to progress, and reporting commenced in the CNSC’s 2005-06 Annual Report.  The following table reports the 2006-07 performance compared to that of 2005-06.

Activity	Performance standard	Performance 2005-06	Target 2006-07	Performance 2006-07
Compliance[3]
Verification: upon completion of the verification activity, the CNSC will:
Issue Type I Inspection Report[4] [5]	Within 60 business days	50%	80%	58%
Issue Type II Inspection Report[6]	Within 40 business days	86%	80%	90%
Issue Desktop Review Report2	Within 60 business days	70%	90%	79%
Enforcement: upon an Order being made, the CNSC will:
Confirm, amend, revoke or replace the Order (see Regulatory Guide G-273)	Within 10 business days	100%	100%	100%
Licensing – for requests pertaining to an existing licence the CNSC will:
Screen the request for completeness and issue notification that the licensing request is / is not complete	Within 20 business days	100%	90%	97%
Issue a licensing decision when a public hearing is not required (assuming an environmental assessment under the CEAA is not required)	Within 80 business days	97%	80%	98%
Issue a licensing decision when a public hearing is required (assuming an environmental assessment under the CEAA is not required) (see INFO-0715)[7] [8]	Within 160 business days	100%	90%	83%
Publish the Records of Proceedings, including Reasons for Decisions, upon conclusion of the public hearing	Within 30 business days	78%	90%	73%
Access to Information
Respond to requests under the Access to Information Act and Privacy Act	Within legislated time periods as stated in the Acts	94%	90%	Access to Information – 82% Privacy – 100%
External Communications
Place public hearings advertisements	Within deadlines stipulated in the regulations	95%	100%	100%
Response time to public inquiries
Acknowledge request		100%	100%	100%
Complete request – low complexity	Same day	100%	100%	100%
Complete request – medium            complexity	Within 5 business days	95%	100%	95%
Complete request – high complexity	Within 10 business days	80%	100%	75%
External Reporting to Central Agencies
File annual Report on Plans and Priorities and Departmental Performance Report (Annual Report on Performance)	Within required timelines	100%	100%	0%[9]

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